**Updated: 25 April 2008 @ 22:30** An article appearing on the left column of the frontpage of today’s New York Times (here) reports that runway incursions seem to present the greatest danger to aviation safety. The last commercial airline crash in the U.S. was the result of runway incursion. The crash occurred when a Canadair regional jet taxied to the wrong runway in Lexington, KY and attempted to take-off. The runway was too short (3,500 feet) for the fully-loaded jet to gain enough thrust for take-off (story here). An N.T.S.B. official, mentioned in today’s article, believes the greatest vulnerability of danger to aviators is runway collisions.
If sophisticated electronic systems are available and if these systems could prevent catastrophic events, should the airlines be required to install them in their aircrafts?
First, commercial aircraft are safer when they are at cruising altitude (and initial climb-out and initial descent) because almost all commerical aircraft have installed T.C.A.S. (“Traffic Collision Avoidance System”). The T.C.A.S. works only when the aircrafts have the appropriate transponder installed. T.C.A.S. provides feedback to pilots about the location of approaching aircraft, including the aircraft’s flight bearing, altitude, and range. When T.C.A.S. detects a potential threat from an oncoming aircraft, the system is designed to give the pilots specific instructions of how to avoid oncoming traffic. Pilots have been advised to heed T.C.A.S.’s warning, under all circumstances.
Second – and interestingly enough – a T.C.A.S. type system is not available for runway operations. Pilots depend on air traffic controllers on giving them appropriate instructions of how to navigate to-and-from the ramp. Oftentimes pilots (this is no joke!) get lost on their way to-and-from the active runway. It is not uncommon for ground operations to give directions four or five times to pilots unfamiliar with the airport. Signage and lighting are confusing, and human error plays a major role in “making wrong turns” or “not paying attention” to visual cues.
Finally, although I think it is a great idea for airlines to install the electronic systems in all of their aircrafts, some problems will never go away. Human error and bad judgment will always be a problem, even if the airlines install the sophisticated systems. In 2002, a Bashkirian Airlines Tupolev 154 collided in mid-air with a DHL Boeing 757 over Uberlingen, Germany. Moments before the impact T.C.A.S. recommended the Bashkirian pilots to ascend and the DHL pilots to descend. If they had performed the action when T.C.A.S. alerted them, the collision would not have taken place. So, no matter how sophisticated the system is tragedies may not be avoided unless aviation personnel are prepared to heed the warnings the system provides.
(NOTE: A second human factor played a role in the 2002 mid-air collision. The air traffic controller on duty was controlling two stations at once, and he became occupied by an Air Lloyd flight initializing an approach. Had he been attending to Uberlingen workstation more attentively, he may have prevented the disaster. A man who was a father to two children and was a husband of a woman on the Bashkirian Airlines flight to Barcelona stabbed and killed the air traffic controller in 2004.)
Update: Today’s New York Times also has a piece (here) on a blame-game between air traffic controllers and pilots at DFW airport. According to Weld’s article, “air traffic control supervisors in Dallas, caught in 2005 hiding instances in which planes had passed too closely, switched to blaming pilots for the incidents.” Further update: The Washington Post has an article too (here). The issues in this case are interesting for business ethics because the F.A.A. has certain rules in place that compel air traffic controllers to alert officials to mistakes. Apparently the rules aren’t enough. Perhaps a future post or future project should address the concerns that have arisen in this case.
