There are many religions. This is a fact. Each religion upholds any number of theological and social beliefs. The theological beliefs of one religion may not be consistent with the theological beliefs in other religions. For example, the Christian belief that human beings require salvation and God provides this salvation through the incarnation, life, sacrificial death, and resurrection of his divine son, Jesus Christ, is not a belief of the people of Islam.
Given the diversity of perspectives among the different religions, either one of the religions is right – in which case all of the others are wrong – or all religions equally well provide distinct paths to the same God, or Ultimate Reality. If neither one of these options is correct, then there has to be a reasonable middle position.
This is the problem of religious diversity. It is an important topic in the philosophy of religion. Those who believe that all religions are different paths to the same God, or Ultimate Reality, are called pluralists. Those who argue that there is only one way to God are called exclusivists. In this post, I want to critically examine Alvin Plantinga’s argument for religious exclusivism. Before I do so, however, I want to provide Plantinga’s rival: the argument for religious pluralism by John Hick.
On Hick’s view, the welter of religious traditions are not inferior to one’s own religious tradition. Since both religious skepticism and religious exclusivism have to treat either all religions as inferior or all religions except one’s own as inferior, he believes both positions are dogmatic. Given that dogmatism is unwarranted, he seeks an alternative position that treats each of the major religious traditions as a genuine response to the presence of the divine in human life.
Hick observes that we experience the world in different ways. Even though we experience the world in different ways, this does not preclude the fact that our experiences do not reflect something about the fundamental nature of reality. For this reason, Hick believes that people with very different religious beliefs can still come in touch with The Real (ultimate reality or God) and make their way toward eternal salvation.
The Real is the source of authentic religious experience. We are confined to the conceptual and symbolic means that our traditions make available to us. So, none of the religions get things literally correct but many of them give us the means to bring us closer to the Ultimate Good.
Plantinga opposes Hick’s religious pluralism. Plantinga holds that belief in God is properly basic. A properly basic belief is one that someone spotaneously believes. For example, suppose that after Jill looks into the starry sky or contemplates the wonders of nature she believes “God created this.” Jill’s belief is properly basic. According to Plantinga, we can apply this belief specifically to Christian beliefs. A properly basic Christian belief occurs when the believer reads the Gospels, hears their message, and becomes convinced.
To support his view of properly basic Christian beliefs Plantinga devises a theory of religious knowledge. In Plantinga’s view, he uses the term “warrant” for the justification condition on true belief. S’s belief is warranted if and only if it’s:
produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth. (from Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief, p. 156)
In a sense, according to Plantinga, we are endowed with a divine sixth sense. The sixth sense leads us to spontaneously form beliefs about God in response to our experiences. Since The Fall (Adam and Eve – the introduction of original sin) our sixth sense has been clouded. When we read scriptures, the Holy Spirit works within us and we come to believe. The role of the Holy Spirit is to cure us of our spiritual blindness and lead us to Christian belief. His theory is merely a model of how knowledge of Christianity could work if Christianity is true.
This implies that religious pluralism is false. We need not say that none of the religions are inferior to any other just because we can’t prove any one of them false.
Here’s a simple argument against Plantinga’s proper function account.
1. There is one true religion out there, but there are decoy religions too. (premise)
2. We might grow up believing that decoy A is the one true religion. (premise)
3. If we grow up believing that decoy A is the one true religion and we are warranted – to use Plantinga’s term – in believing that decoy A is the one true religion, then, according to Plantinga’s argument, we have to think that the decoy is the one true religion. (premise)
4. Thus, according to Plantinga, decoy A is the one true religion, even though, in fact, it’s not. (1-3)
ought religion be exclusive?
Professor I find your coment very appealing. Here is a simple argument that I have formulated about the reason there should exist exclusivity in religion.
1. if god is an absolute and absolutly perfect being, then god’s teachings would be perfect and absolute. (premise)
2. perfect and absolute things require no change or variation. (premise)
3. Therefore, God requires no variation (1,2)
4. if God requires no variation, then his ways, knowlage, principles, teachings, and understandings must require no change, variation, or deviations (2)
5. God’s teachings, understandings and principles are taught via religion (premise)
6. Thus, religion must be unchanging, absolute, perfect, and have no form of deviation. (4,5)
7. if Religion or teachings that are not subject to change due to reasons of perfection, then they are exclusive and absolute (4,6)
8. Thus, religion must be exclusive.
Premise 2 is questionable. Why would perfection imply some kind of stasis?
Premise 4 ignores the fact that God’s teachings and understandings are passed through us imperfect human beings and therefore cannot be presumed to partake of God’s hypothetical perfection. This applies to premise 5 even more strongly.
Perhaps if a religion WERE in fact “unchanging, absolute, perfect” and had “no form of deviation”, it could claim rights to be exclusive–but what reason do we have for believing that any religion has any of these properties, let alone all of them? Or could have, given that any religion is enacted and communicated through us imperfect humans, even if its source might be a perfect God?
Furthermore, there are a variety of religions that teach that there are many paths to God. What if it’s one of these religions that is the “perfect, absolute” etc. religion?
Addofio,
Thank you for the feedback. I really appreciate it. Of course I need to clarify and refine the argument.
Let me explain, I feel that you are misunderstanding premis 4 and confusing it with premise 5. I can see why premis 5 would be questionable, becuase 5 is the first premise the introduces religion into the argument, yet 4 is much more solid than 5.
I will refine my argument:
1.If God is an absolute and perfect being, then God’s ways and teachings would be perfect and absolute. (premise)
2. Perfect and absolute things require no change or variation. (premise)
3. Therefore, God requires no variation (1,2)
4. If God requires no variation then his ways, principles, teachings, and understandings must require no change, variation, or deviations (2)
5. God’s teachings, understandings and principles are taught via religion (premise)
6. Thus, (a perfect) religion must be unchanging, absolute, perfect, and have no form of deviation. (4,5)
7. If religion or teachings that are not subject to change due to reasons of perfection, then they are exclusive and absolute (4,6)
8. Thus, (God’s teaching)religion must be exclusive becuase of perfection
-AS YOU CAN SEE I DID NOT ADJUST THE ARGUMENT. The reason for that is becuase you are looking at premis 2 from a view that is ignoring the nature of God. the defintion for “god” (a supream being that exibits perfect and supernatural charteristics) especially in christian belifs. thus it is impossible that you could understand the argument if you do not accept or understand the nature of God. My statment in 2 is correct by definition god is a supreamand perfect being/enity/spirit, becuase without the defintion of supream/perfect omni-(belvolant,potentent etc) then god cannot containe his title as diety or god. (4) is derived from (2) and if true is valid becusae of my previous explination then 4 is true and valid.
(5) I am not refering to all religions…I am refering to exclusivity “a religion”/ “God’s religion” or “gods thought his way” an absolute. not that every religion should be accepted as absolute that would be a contridicion (1),(2), and (3). I was arguing that there must exist somewhere a absolute and single truth for a absolut and perfect God!
it is true that religion is taught by men, yet if we look into almost any religion we find teachers that claim a divine position in gods “chain of command” now some could attempt to decive by their imperfections or they could have been selected by a “all-knowing god” you could right an argument that says
1 If god is all knowing and all-kind, Then he would no allow us to be decived
2. God dose not allow us to be decived
3. thus he selects ways and means by his omni-belevolance and all-knowing charteristics to ensure that his creations are not decived
If one argues a point you must put you feet in the shoes of the arguer in order to find the weekness!
thanks for the feedback!
Two points:
First, I accept the concept of a perfect God; I just don’t see why that implies a changeless God. Perhaps I’m misunderstanding what you mean by “perfect and absolute things require no change or variation”, but “no change or variation” to me implies a sort of stasis. Whereas I see action and dynamism as part of God’s perfection.
Second, your syllogism at the end. My problem with that is that, if we look around at the real world and the state of religion within it, even assuming that the one “correct” religion exists in it’s “perfect” form within the world, clearly people ARE “decieved”, in that many are convinced they themselves are following the “one true” religion, and yet not everyone who thinks so could be correct.
For anyone who already believes they have the “correct” religion, presumably this isn’t a problem; but unless one already accepts both the existence of a single and exclusively correct religion, and believes that that religion is one’s own–in which case one is assuming the premise to be proved, that religion should be exclusive–it is a problem.
I think that Addofio has a good point about God’s absolute perfection. God’s perfection does not presume an absolute and changeless God. Moreover, none of the other attributes of God (traditionally) assume that God is changeless.
If we assume that God’s perfection is absolutely changeless, then God is not all-powerful. God’s power would allow Him to change. So, John, you’ll need to argue that God is not omnipotent if God’s perfection is absolutely changeless.
This is not impossible to do, but you’d have to give up the traditional conception of God.
Addofio, I think that John might be making a distinction between God permitting people to be deceived and the fact that people are deceived. That people are deceived doesn’t necessarily mean that God has permitted it.
Of course, John owes us an argument for thinking the distinction is present.
Great discussion!
If God is all-powerful and people are deceived–how would God not be “permitting” the deception? Presumably God wouldn’t initiate the deception, but if it occurs then isn’t God allowing it to occur? Possibly for his own, good reasons–but nonetheless, permitting the deception.
First, I think that your assessment has left out an important piece of the puzzle I tried to introduce – modality. There could be a way of making a distinction if we ask: (to put it too simply) Did God necessarily deceive us? Did God make deception possible?
But let me return to what you’ve said, Addofio, because I don’t think we have to get into a discussion of modal logic.
If God doesn’t initiate the deception, then God isn’t permitting the deception. But people are still deceived. So God’s allowing the deception and that people are deceived exemplify two different properties – they are distinct descriptions.
Here’s a more realistic example of the distinction we’re trying to make: Suppose Smith is moving a piano from one location to another. He leaves the piano in a spot where he thinks it won’t move, and he goes into the kitchen to have a ham sandwich. The piano falls and kills an unsuspecting passer-by. The person is dead. But we wouldn’t say that Smith permitted the death, and we definitely wouldn’t say that Smith initiated the death. Would we?
If we say that Smith initiated the death or permitted the death, then we should be held morally accountable for a lot more actions than we should be.
Very Interesting, Thanks oohlah, good point. I’m very thankful for the feedback.
I would like to assert that it is not necessary to remove the idea or concept of a traditional God because I was attempting to put emphasis in my argument about the absolute perfection of God, We must assume that if god is all powerful and all knowing and all-good then it is given that God, by reason of his power and wisdom, has achieved the absolute and utmost level of perfection, (unless he cannot thus he would not be all powerful) give that he is supreme and has the characteristics of and omnipitable being… and if god is eternal in a by his all-powerfulness then his cartelistic must follow his existence. And thus if his cartelistic follow his existence and are contained by him then they are absolute. Thus, if god were to change then he would not be all-knowing. Becuase he must change in order to adapt? or better himself (yet he is perfect and knows all?)? by the definition of an all-knowing and all-powerful God that would not be necessary. (see hebrews 13:8)
could you please explaine how perfect entitys would require change? It seems to me that by changing something would eaither make it less perfect or perhapes, more perfect….? And if an entity is all-knowing wouldent said entity “know” what would be the absolute perfect state?
Presumably Smith is neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, so in that case it makes sense that we would not hold him morally responsible for the death (unless we think he should have reasonably anticipated that the piano would move, or taken reasonable precautions against it moving, like blocking the wheels). However, equally presumably God is both all-knowing and all-powerful, so the analogy doesn’t apply. If God could anticipate that deception will occur (being all-knowing), and could prevent the deception from occurring (being all-powerful), then I return to my question–how is God not permitting the deception? Is there some technical, philosophical meaning to the word “permitting” that I’m missing here?
If I as a parent see my infant toddling toward the fire, and am within reach of the infant–am in a position to prevent the toddler from entering the fire–but make no move to do so–and the infant enters the fire or perhaps grabs the coals, have I not “permitted” the child to be burned? And shouldn’t I be held responsible for the consequences of my inaction?
John: it is not the case that change makes something less perfect. That’s the argument Addofio and I were looking for from you (if I may be so bold to speak on behalf of Addofio). You have to answer the question: Why should we think that a God that changes is less perfect than one that does not?
Addofio: Analogies aren’t perfect, so I agree with you on the difference. But that difference doesn’t weaken the analogy; it brings the controversial issue of God’s actions to light.
I think your question, “how is God not permitting the deception?,” has a lot built into it. First, does God necessarily deceive us? Or, is it: does God make deception possible? These are two different questions. So, I guess there is a technical, philosophical worry in the background I’m not clear on.
Notice also that the propositions “God deceives Smith” and “Smith is deceived” exemplify two different properties. If the propositions exemplify different properties, then they’re distinct. If they’re distinct, then it is possible that Smith’s being deceived isn’t the result of God’s deceiving Smith.
I see, and I understand what argument you would like to address. My argument needs clarification. I actually am trying to say that a perfect person that is all knowing and all-powerful entity would not need to EVER change. I would like to ask: can a perfect being change even if it possesses attributes that are absolute and “perfect”? One would assume that if a being is all-knowing then obviously it would know it would require no change at all. Is it necessary for such to change? Why should we think that a God that changes is less perfect than one that does not?
Becuase God would not be able to be all-knowing or all-powerful this is because it could not change something that God knows to be a perfect and “utmost” adaptable characteristic from that, his teaching or understanding/principles would then be perfect and absolutely complete according to his eternal and never-ending omnipotence and other (absolute attributes) etc.
so why should we assume that God must change according to the individual necessities of man if deception can be brought about by the deceptions of men?
Ok I have a question so that i can formulate this argument, answer me this: if god is omniscient and thereby knows his future actions, is he capable of escaping his own plot?
i think we are trying to give God human characteristics by asking questions like that when we all know He is higher than us…could we ? Could God be capable of escaping an escape from His own plot?
I think that in order for anyone to be able to embrace religion to it’s fullest they must at least believe that it is the only true religion. When religion is a ‘whatever’ thing it does almost no good to mankind other than lead him into a false sense of security, which causes more damage that it could ever possibly contribute in good.
But I do not agree with Plantinga agruement that if someone believes in a certain religion stong enough and gains a witness of the religion that the religion than becomes true. Such a conclusion is counterproductive leaving to many thinking that they have the only truth. Also I feel that God would only provide for one true religion on the earth, and that he would be the keeper of it. There are no doubt many wonderful religion that lift people to seemingly immpossible height of acheivement, but there has been, is, and we can only expect more conflict over religion. Something that one would not hold God accountable for.
The fact is, so many peope of diffing religions feel that they believe in the one “true” religion. This observation about the world combined with the simple argument against Plantinga’s proper function account at the end of the post, as I see them, refute plantinga’s religious exclusivism.
Here is another simple argument to further articulate my thoughts:
1. If there were one true religion, we would expect to observe a certain degree of uniformity of religious belief throughout the world, and a certain degree of conflict (i.e. very little) between false religions and the true religion.
2. There actually is far less uniformity and far more conflict than one would expect were there one true religion.
3. Therefore, there must not be one true religion.
What do you think? I would like help in thinking through this some more. I realize the premises need a lot more backing but… it’s late.
John,
I would have to disagree with (1). Because in terms of deception man could mimic and copy a true religion in order to fulfill personal objectives. Thus, the reason for the current lack of “uniformity” could be the interpretations or ideas of men and not the intentions of God. The phrase in (2) ” far more conflict than one would expect ” is not defined properly. The reason I say this is because what conflict? Are you referring to basic beliefs? Are you referring to practices or ordnances? Conflict must also be necessary to support fact that for every action there is an equal but opposite reaction. Thus, if there is truth there must be falsehood. And if we are truly free agents then we have the ability to create conflict and cause falsehoods and deceptions. For those reasons I feel that (2) is not adequately supported to be a successful premise.
How about this for a set of premises:
God is infinite in perfection. Therefore, truths about God are also infinite.
Humans and our institutions, including our religious institutions, are finite, including being finite in understanding.
Therefore humans, individually or collectively, cannot encompass or know all the truth there is about God.
As we look around us, we see that God created an exuberantly diverse creation. Billions of galaxies; here on earth, millions of different species of living creatures, and huge variation within species; thousands of languages and cultures among humans; and each individual person is unique. We might conclude from this that God likes variety.
Part of the human diversity we see is in religion. Perhaps God has either brought this about, or at the least has allowed this to be the case, so that collectively, humans can express, or know, or discover, more of God’s truths.
Just some food for thought.
You could conclude that God likes variety, yet is the varitey that he has placed on earth for the benifit and existiance of men and not to mearly paint a picture or provide some artistic exposition..?