Ginet’s criterion for action individuation establishes that actions are layered structures. Given that two action descriptions, say X and Y, are co-agential, that is, the agents they refer to are the same, and are co-temporal, that is, the times they refer to overlap in such a way that the action designated by each description occurred during the same period of time, X and Y designate the same action if and only if:
- X is semantically equivalent to Y;
- X consists in Y; and
- for every canonical action-designator Z, Z generates X if and only if Z generates Y.
Each of the above conditions must be present for two action descriptions to designate the same action. In this post, I’ll ignore problems with (1) and (3) so that I can focus on (2).
Ginet defines the “consists in” relation this way: “Suarez’s dialing the phone call at t” consisted in “Suarez’s turning the rotary dial at t” if and only if Suarez’s dialing the phone at t consisted in Suarez’s turning the rotary dial. So, the by-relation holds for the consists in relation. If X consisted in Y, then X by Y. So, if Suarez’s dialing 555-2239 consisted in Suarez’s first turning the dial from 5 and then turning the dial from 5, and so on, then just because of that, Suarez dialed 555-2239 by first turning the dial from 5 and then turning the dial from 5, and so on.
On Ginet’s account, we should say that an aggregate action has a plurality of parts that are themselves actions. But we perform some actions where the whole has more than one non-overlapping action performed by one agent. Suppose that Moreshead plays golf on Tuesday afternoon, and he attends the P.G.A. Teaching Seminar two months later. Moreshead’s playing golf and attending the seminar are two distinct acts. Moreshead’s playing golf is neither intended as a means to or a condition for his going to the seminar. So, there’s no reason to say that Moreshead’s attending the seminar consisted in his playing golf. (I’m also reminded here of Wimpy’s false promise, “I’ll pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today; but, alas, I’m not sure how that fits.)
Ginet might argue that since the two acts are temporally disassociated, his account of concrete action and the criterion of action individuation do not share this feature. Thus, if aggregate action is a typical sort of concrete action, then it cannot be temporally disassociated.
Let me modify the example a bit to quash Ginet’s rebuttal. Suppose that while Moreshead’s golfing his wife phones him and indicates that she’s going into labor, so he dashes off the golf courase to the hospital. Moreshead’s dashing off the course and his playing golf are temporally connected in a way that his playing golf and attending the teaching seminar are not. Thus, on Ginet’s account, Moreshead’s playing golf and his dashing off to the hospital are aggregate actions.
We do not want to say that the two actions constitute parts of a larger action because dashing off the golf course is not a part of the game. If it were, people would be fleeing from the course all the time. Accounts of the criterion for action individuation must specify the conditions under which various actions of an agent constitute parts of a larger action. Ginet’s account doesn’t do this adequately. So, we must reject his account.
Hi Joe! WordPress directed me to this post from a not-very related post of mine; I wonder if it’s a coincidence?
Anyway, could Ginet bite the bullet and say that he wants to allow unrestricted composition of actions? Many people are OK with allowing unrestricted composition of objects, things like my nose and the Eiffel tower; could Ginet just say something similar about spatiotemporally connected actions, and say that playing golf + dashing off the course is an action, even if it isn’t one that’s easy to name? I haven’t read Ginet on this at all so I don’t know if this is a position he could take.
Good question Matt (on all counts)! First, I’m not sure if it’s coincidence. I’ll get back to you on that.
On the unrestricted composition of spatiotemporally connected actions, it’s difficult to understand Ginet’s (and other action theorists) views. It’s at least somewhat related to the question “When does some action occur?” which is something I’ve been very interested in recently.
I don’t think Ginet’s willing to say that either playing golf is a part of dashing off the course or dashing off the course is a part of playing golf. He might contend that moving one’s hands or moving one’s arms is a part of the layered structure of the action: playing golf (or dashing off the course, as the case may be).
There may be reasons for one’s dashing off the course that are not a part of one’s reasons for playing golf.
I think this is Ginet’s response, and I am reasonably confident that it’s a response to concern over the problem of when an action occurs.
Here’s the problem. Suppose that Smith is a leader of a country. He has the power to launch nuclear missiles at specific targets. One day he pushes a button in his office, which is a direct link to the the nuclear missile silo. The missile warms-up for launch. It takes for the missile about three hours to warm-up. After 3 hours, the missile is launched. It takes 2 hours to reach its intended target, thereby razing the enemy city. Meantime, Smith has lunch, plays a round of golf, and has a few beers after his round. Ginet’s layered structure of action seeks to avoid, on the one hand, the unusual consequence that Smith’s having a beer is razing the enemy city, and, on the other hand, the unusual consequence that because the two acts, Smith’s pushing the button and Smith’s razing the enemy city, are temporally distinct the two acts are completely distinct (i.e., one may not be the result of the other).